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Abstract
The new knowledge-based economy is also
known as “the information economy,” “the second
industrial revolution” or “the post-industrial society.”
It finally arrived in the twenty-first century after being
heralded for a long time. The new economy focuses
on talent, knowledge, and information. It is based on
mobile services, such as email, the internet, and
intranets, which make new dot com companies more
competitive in this new economy. This economy is
global, and it will steadily increase the globalization
of businesses. The basic issue concerning corporate
governance in the new economy is whether corporate
directors should view themselves solely as the
stewards of their investors’ capital, and so aim to
maximize shareholder value, or whether they should
view themselves as the custodians of their companies’
human capital, and thus concentrate more on
protecting the interests and developing the knowledge
and skills of their employees. In the new economy,
people play an increasingly significant role in
corporate governance in the midst of the
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transformation from an industrialized to an
information-oriented society. This article discusses
the importance of employees in terms of their role as
one of the primary stakeholders in a company, in
order to consider why human capital has become
centralized, and the nature and scope of legal rules
and mechanisms that should be adopted regarding
human capital, using the legislative experiences of the
UK and China as two case studies.
Keywords: new economy, stakeholder theory, human
capital, employees, company law
It is not the strongest of the species that survive,
nor the most intelligent, but the ones most
responsive to change.
– Charles Darwin

INTRODUCTION
Despite conflicting views about their impacts, increasing
globalization and the development of information technology over
the last two decades are changing every single aspect of the way we
work, and particularly the ways in which economies develop. 1
Compared to conventional methods of production, production in the
modern economy is more likely to be in an intangible form, based on
the exploitation of ideas rather than material things. This is the socalled weightless economy, which is seen as a significant change in
light of the new technology and the knowledge explosion that has
taken place since the 1990s. In addition, technological development
has brought about a higher sustained level of productivity growth,
allowing faster economic growth with lower inflation. 2 Therefore,
many academics and practitioners use the term “new economy” to
1

Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80
CHI. KENT. L. REV. 839, 839–40 (2005); HM TREASURY, A STRONG AND
STRENGTHENING ECONOMY: INVESTING IN BRITAIN’S FUTURE, ECONOMIC AND
FISCAL STRATEGY REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT AND BUDGET REPORT, HC
968, at 2 (2006).
2
Robert L. Formaini & Thomas F. Siems, New Economy Myths and Reality, 3 FED.
RES. BANK DALL. S. W. ECON. 4 (May/June, 2003).
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describe the economy of the world from the 1990s onwards,
especially with reference to developed countries. 3
With society becoming progressively more knowledge-based
and information-based, employees are increasingly being considered
as assets of a company and one of the company’s biggest overheads.4
In knowledge-based industries, employees, as providers of human
capital, have become the key to business success, since such
companies are heavily dependent on their employees’ knowledge,
expertise and active involvement in order to outperform other
companies.
From a European perspective, the importance of placing
human capital investment at the forefront of policies to promote
economic growth and social cohesion was explicitly outlined in the
Lisbon Summit of the European Council in March 2000, and has been
repeatedly emphasized ever since as a key strategy to turn the
European Union (EU) into the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world. 5 Scholars have identified
measures that increase the quantity and quality of the stock of human
capital as important aspects of any growth-promoting policy
package.6 As employees have acquired their new status as resources
for corporate investment, the protection of employees’ interests
becomes increasingly important.
In terms of corporate governance and company law,
considering the interests of the company’s employees has long been
required in the decision-making of a company’s management. The
current debate has advanced our thinking about the effective and
appropriate governance of the modern corporation, the nature of
business ethics or corporate social responsibility, and the extent to
which these progressive thoughts should be imposed through duties
upon companies or practiced by employers through their business
3

For examples, see David J. Teece, Capturing Value from Knowledge Assets: The
New Economy, Markets for Know-How, and Intangible Assets, 40 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 55 (1998); Christian Lyhne Ibsen & Kathleen Thelen, Diverging Solidarity
Labor Strategies in the New Knowledge Economy, 69 WORLD POL. 409 (2017);
FISK, supra note 1.
4
GILES PROCTOR & LILIAN MILES, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 56 (2002).
5
European Commission Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs
Unit A.1, Human Capital in a Global and Knowledge-based Economy: Final
Report, at IV (May, 2002).
6
Id. at 11.
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judgements. 7 The discussion of the importance to be given to
employees’ interests has become a part of the ongoing process of
company law reform. We have witnessed cases in which the interests
of employees in developing countries were harmed by the
misconducts of multinational enterprises.8 The British Home Stores
(BHS) scandal in the UK that put employees’ pensions at risk, for
example, reminds us of the significance of employee protection in
public companies.9
Inevitably, this creates questions about the transportability of
“best practices” of corporate governance, particularly in AngloAmerican shareholder-oriented countries where employees’ interests
have not traditionally been the central managerial concerns.
Therefore, changes to the world economy have created a need to
address the new demands of companies, employees and society, and
to fundamental re-think principles of company law and policy. A
7

See, e.g., Sally Wheeler, Labor and the Corporation, 6 J. CORP. L. STUD. 361,
388–96 (2006); for discussions on the other side of the debate, see Milton
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/afriedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html
[https://perma.cc/83SP-RHTD].
8
See Connelly v. RTZ Corp. plc [1997] UKHL 30, [1999] CLC 533 (Eng.)
(recognizing rights of an employee to bring employment claims before the British
courts on grounds of substantial justice, despite forum non conveniens
applicability); Lubbe v. Cape Plc. and Related Appeals [2000] 1 WLR 1545 (Eng.),
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2000/41.html [https://perma.cc/33C7-CFST]
(regarding plea of forum non conveniens as not sustainable on the ground that the
case may be tried more suitably in favor of employees and victims in other forums);
Newton-Sealey v. Armorgroup Services Ltd. [2008] EWHC 233 (QB) (Eng.),
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff74060d03e7f57eaa691#
[https://perma.cc/Y6UB-8E8Z] (attributing duty of care liability to several
corporations part of a corporate group); Chandler v. Cape [2012] 1 WLR 3111
(Eng.),
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff71960d03e7f57ea77ca
[https://perma.cc/HW86-HHHH] (establishing responsibility of a parent company
for the health and safety of its subsidiary company’s employees); Okpabi and others
v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc and another [2018] EWCA 191 (Eng.).
9
See Paddy Ireland, From Lonrho to BHS: The Changing Character of Corporate
Governance in Contemporary Capitalism, 29 KING’S L.J. 3, 5–6 (2018) (discussing
the ethic deprivation in modern-day capitalism); see also FINANCIAL REPORTING
COUNCIL, WATES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR LARGE PRIVATE
COMPANIES, 2018 (Eng.) (introducing corporate governance standards for large
private companies based on their economic and social significance and comparable
risks to a wide a range of stakeholders).
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number of questions therefore arise: If human capital is so important
in the new economy, what are the necessary measures for protecting
the interests of employees with their new status as human capital, in
order to promote the competence of the company? Does the adoption
of the stakeholder approach the right way to make corporate directors
more responsive to employees’ interests? What are the mechanisms
available in the domain of company law, and are they effective in
promoting employees’ interests?
The Article starts with an introduction to the concept of the
new economy and an analysis of the relationships between the new
economy, corporate governance, and human capital. Second, the
Article discusses the interests of employees in the new economy,
especially with regard to their position as primary stakeholders who
have a crucial and indispensable responsibility in promoting the
success of the company. Following that discussion, arguments are
presented regarding the protection of employees’ interests through a
heightened duty supported by information disclosure in the
Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV) model in the UK company law,
and the more diverse board structure supported by soft law 10
approaches embedded in Chinese Company law.

THE NEW ECONOMY, STAKEHOLDERS’ INTERESTS, AND
HUMAN CAPITAL
Initially appearing in Time in 1983,11 the term “new economy”
has been widely employed in a large amount of literature, although
there is no agreed definition of the term. 12 However, a common
feature shared by all academics in their use of the concept is the
emphasis on the significance of information. Generally speaking, the
10

“Soft law” is defined by OECD as “co-operation based on instruments that are
not legally binding, or whose binding force is somewhat ‘weaker’ than that of
traditional law, such as codes of conduct, guidelines, roadmaps, peer reviews.”
OECD, SOFT LAW, https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/irc10.htm
[https://perma.cc/9S6J-XHV3] (last visited June 30, 2020).
11
See Charles P. Alexander, The New Economy, TIME (May 30, 1983)

http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,926013-1,00.html
[https://perma.cc/5CXZ-B8TX].
12
Jack E. Triplett, Economic Statistics, the New Economy, and the Productivity
Slowdown, 34 BUS. ECON. 13, 13–5 (1999).
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new economy has been defined by economists in both broad and
narrow perspectives. In the broad perspective, some scholars traced
this concept to the 1991 economic expansion in the US, which is
characterized by strong growth in real gross domestic product (GDP)
and per capita GDP, higher rates of investment, as well as low
inflation and unemployment.13 Gavyn et al. redefined the notion as a
“new paradigm” with driving forces including technical progress,
globalisation, product market structure modifications, and labour
market structure modifications.14 Three basic characteristics of the
new economy can be derived from the foregoing: first, there is a
strong GDP growth; second, there is a drop in unemployment and
inflation; and most importantly, there is a trend towards long-term
wealth creation, which mainly results from the significant
technological innovations from the mid-1990s onwards. 15
As for the narrow perspective, the term “new economy”
incorporates the development of information technology and the
internet, together with their impact on the economy. Gordon
understands the term as an equivalent to an acceleration in the rate of
technical advances in information technology (IT). However, he does
not take into account its contribution prior to 1995 when he defines
the new economy as encompassing the mid-1990s acceleration in the
rate of price decline in computer hardware, the corollary of an
acceleration of exponential growth rate of computer power, and the
wildfire speed of development of the Internet. 16 Similarly, Bosworth
and Triplett focus on the role of IT as an accelerator of the economy’s
rate of output and productivity growth when they claim that the new
economy embraces IT developments, namely computers, peripherals,
computer software, communications, and related equipment. 17
13

Barbara M. Fraumeni & Steven J. Landefeld, Measuring the New Economy, 81(3)
SURV. CURRENT BUS. 23, 23–25 (2001).
14
Nicola Jentzsch, The New Economy Debate in the U.S.: A Review of Literature
in PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 80, 84 (L.A. Finley ed., 2006) (quoting
Gavyn Davies, Martin Brookes & Neil Williams, Technology, the Internet and the
New Global Economy, in GOLDMAN SACHS GLOB. ECON. PAPER NO: 39 (2002)).
15
See generally Nicola Jentzsch, The New Economy Debate in the US: A Review of
Literature (John F. Kennedy Inst. for N. Am. Studies, Section of Econ., Working
Paper No. 125, 2001) (introducing different definitions of the New Economy).
16
Robert J. Gordon, Does the New Economy Measure up to the Great Inventions of
the Past?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (2000).
17
Barry P. Bosworth & Jack E. Triplett, What’s New About the New Economy? IT,
Economic Growth and Productivity, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 1–3 (Dec. 12, 2000),
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The next question concerns with what makes the new
economy new. Atkinson and Court argue that compared to the
traditional economy, the new economy is “a knowledge and ideabased economy where the keys to wealth and job creation are the
extent to which ideas, innovation, and technology are embedded in
all sectors of the economy.”18 Along with notable improvements in
technology, production, and trading patterns across the world,
companies increasingly face competition on an international level.
The rule of the game in this type of competition is that the fast eats
the slow. Dot com companies and network companies constitute new
organisational forms of corporations, with flexible, devolved, and
interconnected subsystems. The key drivers in supporting enterprise
are people and their knowledge and capabilities.19 The success of a
company is measured by the market price of the entire company,
which is influenced by elements like share price, reputation of the
company, value of the trademark, and so on. Leadership is always
based on a shared power structure, with employee empowerment and
self-leadership. Employees are regarded as an investment of the
company. In contrast, in the old economy, the preconditions for states’
economic success included issues such as low costs; abundant,
basically skilled labor; and good transportation and other physical
infrastructure.”20 In this system, the key driver to the growth of an
enterprise is capital. 21 The rule of the game for this type of
competition is that the big eats the small; the success of the company
is measured by profit; and the leadership of the company is purely
vertical. The employees are seen as expenses of the company.

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20001020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6S7P-R64Z].
18
ROBERT D. ATKINSON, RANDOLPH H. COURT & JOSEPH M. WARD, THE STATE
NEW ECONOMY INDEX REPORT: BENCHMARKING ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN
THE STATES 5 (Jul. 1999), http://www2.itif.org/1999-state-new-economy-index.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G55G-XRKB].
19
For more discussions on knowledge-based economy, see Richard G. Harris, The
Knowledge‐based Economy: Intellectual Origins and New Economic
Perspectives 3 INT’L J. MGMT REV. 21, 21 (2002).
20
ATKINSON ET AL, supra note 18, at 6.
21
PETER J. VAN BAALEN & LARS T. MORATIS, MANAGEMENT EDUCATION IN THE
NETWORK ECONOMY: ITS CONTEXT, CONTENT, AND ORGANIZATION 33 (2001).
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The New Economy and Corporate Governance
Continuing changes in the business world, including the
widespread employment of new technologies, the globalization of the
economy and society, and increasing competition in both the public
and private sectors, have all had a great impact on the transformation
of organizations’ internal structures, strategies and management
approaches.22
Before discussing employees as a primary stakeholder in a
company, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the notion of a
“stakeholder.” The term first appeared in management literature in
an internal memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute in 1963. 23
The use of “stakeholder” to refer to a variety of constituencies who
participate in a business has been commonly accepted since the 1980s,
after the publication of Freeman’s Strategic Management, a landmark
book in business literature.24 In that book, the concept of stakeholders
is defined as “those groups without whose support the organization
would cease to exist”, originally including shareowners, employees,
customers, lenders and society.25 The most famous and frequently
cited definition is given in an essay by Evan and Freeman, where
stakeholders are described as “those groups who have a stake in or
claim on the firm.” 26 According to the relationship between their
interests and the company, stakeholders can be divided into primary
stakeholders and secondary stakeholders. They can be also divided
into internal and external stakeholders, depending on whether they
are members of the company.
As a key stakeholder group, employees have an interest in the
company since it provides their livelihood, and at some point in the
future after they retire, employees may also benefit financially from
22

Gillian Shapiro, Employee Involvement: Opening the Diversity Pandora’s Box?,
29 PERSONNEL REV. 304 (2000) (exploring the impact of employee diversity on
efficient business management).
23
Elaine Sternberg, The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, 5 SCHOLARLY RES. &
THEORY PAPERS 3 (1997).
24
R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
(1984) (exploring various management and stakeholder strategies on corporations).
25
Id. at 31–32.
26
William Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern
Corporation in An Introduction to BUSINESS ETHICS 254, 255 (George D.
Chryssides, John H. Kaler eds., 1993).
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the company’s pension scheme.27 In return, employees can enhance
the innovation and sustainable development of their company by
providing their own expertise and experiences. They are the ones
who invent and produce products, deliver their professional services
to the company, create its profits, and represent it to the external
world. 28 Employees tend to have a strong and interdependent
relationship with the company they work for. On the one hand,
employees are concerned with the company’s important strategies,
such as working conditions, pension schemes and so on. By virtue of
their length of service and the relative inflexibility of their bond with
the company, for example, their livelihood which is dependent on
their employment, employees strive to secure their interests within
the company. 29 On the other hand, the company’s development,
especially the implementation of long-term strategies, largely
depends on its employees’ recognition and performance of corporate
strategic plans and employees’ participation 30 in the corporate
governance.
Traditionally, under the shareholder value principle which
dominates in the UK, the role played by employees in corporate
governance has not been as active as that of their counterparts in
countries in Continental Europe. It has been found that the main
methods of communication between UK management teams and their
employees were one-way—for instance, staff newsletters, notice
boards and emails 31 —in which employees functioned as inactive
receivers rather than dynamic involvers. The unions who represent
the employees have suffered an overall decline in membership, 32 and
27

CHRISTINE MALLIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 70–71 (4th ed. 2013).
Janet Williamson, A Trade Union Congress Perspective on the Company Law
Review and Corporate Governance Reform since 1997, 41 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL.
511, 514 (2003) (examining Corporate Governance reforms and their impact on
employee and stockholder relationships).
29
Company law requires directors to take account of employees’ interests in
matters affecting the company. However, there is no enforcement mechanism for
employees to use when directors fail to take account of their employees’ interests.
See Companies Act 1985, §§ 309, 719 (UK). See also Insolvency Act 1986, §187
(UK).
30
See Henry Hansmann, Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U.
TORONTO L. J. 589,
31
PROCTOR & MILES, supra note 4, at 56.
32
Based on the figures to date, memberships fell from 8,939,000 in 1989 to
7,321,000 between 1999 and 2000. Figures based on data collected by
28
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their influence on the management and governance of companies has
been seriously undermined.33
Since the 1990s, however, with society becoming
progressively more knowledge and information-based, employees are
increasingly being considered as assets of the company. As one of
the company’s biggest overheads in terms of cost, 34 the success of the
business cannot be achieved if excellent, highly educated people are
not attracted to work there. In knowledge-based industries—for
instance, the software and pharmaceutical industries—employees
have become the key to success because companies are so heavily
dependent on their employees’ knowledge, expertise and active
involvement in order to outperform other companies. Employees in
these industries are generally regarded as non-substitutable, since
they are often specialists in certain areas. Due to the company’s
reliance on their expertise, they are very difficult to replace.
Even in the case of substitutable employees, their interests
cannot be ignored. Some employee organisations, by using methods
such as strikes, can easily put companies into difficulties. Given the
employees’ increasing significance in corporate development, it has
even been suggested by stakeholder proponents that employees and
shareholders should both be recognised as residual claimants of the
company. 35 If the preferential consideration of shareholders’
interests can be justified by the claim that they bear the greatest risk
relative to other stakeholders, there is a similar justification for
treating the employees’ interest in the same manner. Employees
always find it difficult to obtain a similar job after losing their
employment when a company becomes insolvent. Employees also
bear the risks of loss of income, skills, confidence and health, perhaps
on a permanent basis.36 Compared to the risks borne by shareholders,
Employment Market Analysis and Research (EMAR) for the Office of National
Statistics,
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20111108174522/http://www.dius.gov.
uk/policies/employment-matters/research [https://perma.cc/MF74-CKEZ].
33
PROCTOR & MILES, supra note 4, at 58.
34
PROCTOR & MILES, supra note 4, at 56.
35
Margaret M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance
for the Twenty-First Century, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 183 (Thomas Clarke
ed., 2004).
36
WILLIAMSON, supra note 28, at 511, 513 (examining Corporate Governance
reforms and their impact on employee and stockholder relationships).
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who can and do diversify their risks by holding a portfolio of shares,
the risks borne by employees seem disproportionately high.
Therefore, how to modify the traditional shareholder-oriented
scheme to protect employees’ interest has become an essential issue.
Employee’ Interests under the Paradigm of the New Economy
In the new Economy, employees can not only accelerate the
pace of innovation through their expertise, but also affect the pace at
which new products gain widespread use and produce significant
sales.37 Managing employees in this context has special challenges.
As argued by Grant, “if knowledge is the pre-eminent productive
resource and most knowledge is created by and stored within
individuals, then employees are the primary stakeholders. The
principal management challenge . . . is establishing mechanisms by
which cooperating individuals can co-ordinate their activities in order
to integrate their knowledge into productive activities.” 38
In the new economy, more extensive education and training
are expected from potential employees, to allow the new technologies
of the company to be developed and adapted. It is also expected that
directors should accumulate adequate human capital for research and
development, in order to ensure long lasting property of the
company.39 Therefore, the dominant role of employees in the new
knowledge-based economy promotes a pragmatic consideration of
stakeholder interests in shareholder-oriented jurisdictions, in order to
realise the long-term interests of the company. A basic question
therefore arises for corporate governance: Should corporate directors
view themselves solely as stewards of their investors’ capital and aim
to maximise value for shareholders, or should they view themselves
instead as custodians of their company’s “human capital” and thus
concentrate on protecting the interests and developing the knowledge
and skills of their employees?40
37

FORMAINI & SIEMS, supra note 2, at 1, 2.
Robert M. Grant, The Knowledge-Based View of the Firm: Implications for
Management Practice, 30 LONG RANGE PLANNING 450, 452 (1997).
39
JEFFREY H. GREENHAUS & GERARD A CALLANAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CAREER
DEVELOPMENT 360 (2006).
40
Joichi Aoi, To Whom Does the Company Belong? A New Management Mission
for the Information Age, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE U.S., JAPAN, & EUROPE 244, 246
(Donald H. Chew ed., 1997).
38

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

393

Investment in human capital contributes significantly to
productivity growth, especially for high technology science-based
companies. It is estimated that human capital accounted for 22% of
the observed productivity growth in the period from 1969 to 1990,
and 45% of the productivity differential with the sample average in
1990.41 Employees, as providers of human capital, play a key role in
fostering innovation and change within their company. However,
such contribution has been largely unaccounted for. It is argued that
one of the most significant successes of the modern corporation is to
attract talented workers, who otherwise might have become
independent entrepreneurs, without offering them ownership, control,
or even the obligation of directors’ considerations towards their
interests.42
Today’s consumers demand customised products, which will
inevitably result in a more demanding role for employees in terms of
their initiative and creativity. Thus, corporate directors should
identify and encourage the development of the employees’ “human
assets” in personalised ways and utilization of the employees’ highly
subjective tastes and idiosyncratic ways of thinking, in order to
contribute to the company’s success. 43
The massive shift in manufacturing capacity, from Western
economies to those countries that offer access to cheaper labour, will
continue to be a significant trend in the era of new economy. This
will not only create jobs for local communities in developing
countries, but will also “create severe pressure for unskilled workers
in more advanced economies.”44 This transition will also cause social
problems concerning employment environments in developing
countries, where the interests of employees cannot be effectively and
thoroughly protected by employment law. Disasters might happen
and unethical working conditions might prevail in developing
countries due to the negligence of corporate directors. Meanwhile,
employees in those countries do not have access to relevant
information in order to protect themselves, because of their poorly
41

EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 4.
42
FISK, supra note 1 at 843 (2005) (exploring metaphors and narratives in context
of labor and employment law).
43
AOI, supra note 40, at 247.
44
PHILIP SADLER, BUILDING TOMORROW’S COMPANY: A GUIDE TO SUSTAINABLE
BUSINESS SUCCESS 19 (2002).
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developed information systems compared with those countries which
have already transitioned to the new economy.
For example, in the Bhopal incident in 1984, 20,000 people,
including employees, were killed or harmed by a chemical leak from
the American-owned Union Carbide India Limited pesticide plant in
the city. 45 The leak could have been prevented if procedures,
management and maintenance at the plant had been more rigorous.
As a second example, the use of child labour in factories in the
developing world, whereby multinational companies produce cheap
products to sell in Western markets, “became an international issue
in the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium.”46 In light
of these examples, there are proposals that directors should have
regards to employees’ interests, including those employed by their
subsidiaries or suppliers, as key stakeholders, in order to secure the
health and safety of their employees. Multinational enterprises have
evolved to become complex organisations inculcated with
personhood, institutional structure, and state-like qualities that have
a profound impact on our society. 47 The constant issue in the
discourse on corporate responsibility and corporate objectives is how
to address the problem of vulnerability and help the constituencies
such as employees in the developing or the least development
countries who are particularly vulnerable to the effects of corporate
actions. Corporations should be managed in the public interest as
compensation for the limited liability granted to them by states, and
governments should only distribute resources on the condition of
corporations meeting their wider duties. 48 Employees should be
45

Swati Bhasin, Lest We Forget: Bhopal Gas Tragedy That Choked Thousands to
Death In 1984 (Dec. 3, 2019, 1:13 PM), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/35years-on-bhopal-gas-tragedy-that-choked-thousands-to-death-in-1984-2142537
[https://perma.cc/S24D-HRRN].
46
COLIN FISHER & ALAN LOVELL, BUSINESS ETHICS AND VALUE: INDIVIDUAL,
CORPORATE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 53 (3rd ed. 2006).
47
Heather M. Kolinsky, Situating the Corporations within the Vulnerability
Paradigm: What Impact Does Corporate Personhood Have on Vulnerability,
Dependency and Resilience, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 51, 52 (2017).
48
George Shepherd, Not Just Profits: The Fiduciary Duty of Corporate Leaders to
the Public, Not Just Shareholders 11 (unpublished article, University of Leeds,
School of Law, UK, A Workshop on Professionalism and Vulnerability October 27–
28,
2017)
(on
file
with
authors),
https://www.slsa.ac.uk/images/2017winter/Professionalismand_vulnerabilitylink.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7GA-XXR3].
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offered more information about the company by the directors,
including operational information and safety knowledge. Also, they
should be aware of both the domestic and international legal
requirements and should give local managers sufficient training about
legal and local ethical policy issues.
In addition to the information disclosure, employees acting as
stakeholder directors of the company and participating in the board
could also help in decision-making. Since employees are closely
aligned with key elements of CSR such as working environment or
the needs of the employees, employee directors will facilitate a better
environment for the board to explain the rationale underlying its
decisions. Therefore, boards with employee directors may promote
a more explicit recognition and appreciation of stakeholder concerns
and form a powerful and legitimate representation of a company’s
power in decisions-making. Alternatively, the company could
organize periodic stakeholder meetings with participation by its
employees, in order to give employees an opportunity to stay
involved in the operation of the company. Realistically, these
meetings could be held annually, adopting a similar format to
shareholders’ annual meetings, in order to provide a way to achieve
strategic objectives through stakeholder communication initiating
and facilitating “respectful, honest and productive multi‐lateral
communication with their stakeholders.” 49 These meetings also
allow stakeholders to have adequate time to think about proposals and
suggestions. Such annual meetings will also allow employees to
consider all the factors raised by stakeholders in their catalogue.
These meetings will be educational and informational for both board
members and stakeholder participants. They will not only deal with
general inquiries and feedback but also cover issues surrounding the
risks and challenges that the company might face in the future. A
well-attended and useful meeting will reflect a well-maintained
relationship between the company and its employees.

49

James Noland & Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Engagement, Discourse Ethics and
Strategic Management, 12 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 39, 48 (2010).
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PROTECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER
ENGLISH COMPANY LAW
The UK has been regarded as a leader in the Anglo-American
countries in terms of its transition towards the Continental model.
This comes as a result of integrating stakeholder considerations into
the narrowly defined objective of shareholder value in its company
law. The objective is achieved by the recent introduction of the ESV
principle, which requires directors to take stakeholders’ interests into
consideration, and the rapid growth of CSR activities.50 The ESV
principle explicitly advocates a shift in focus towards the long-term
interests of the company, which requires the directors of the company
to recognize and report the effects of their business performance on
various non-shareholder constituencies, such as employees,
communities and the environment. The goal of the company law
legislation in the UK’s appears to be the maintenance of “its
corporations’ financial accountability to a constituency of dispersed,
independent shareholders while simultaneously using market forces
to nudge companies in the direction of greater social responsibility”
by taking stakeholders’ interests into account. 51
“Whether it is a question of fair wages and conditions, sexual
harassment in the workplace”, or maybe just the employees taking
advantage of company resources, such as the phone or the internet,
for personal use, “employee-related ethical problems are unavoidable
for most cotemporary mangers.” 52 This Article only focuses on the
employment issues that should be considered by managers and
directors under company law, rather than employment law and
pension law in general, although directors’ duties in those areas are
also significant.

50

Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion
of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493,
550 (2005); Simon Deakin, The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value, 13
CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV 11, 16 (2005).
51
WILLIAMS & CONLEY, supra note 50, 500 (2005).
52
ANDREW CRANE & DIRK MATTEN, BUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
MANAGING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 286 (4th ed. 2016).
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Legislative Attempts before the Companies Act 2006
Based on the idea that company law and labor law were in
essence separate fields of regulatory policies,53 English company law
statutes before the 1970s paid little attention to employees’ interests.
The interests of employees and their relationships with employers
were mainly defined and protected through labour and employment
legislations, including the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996)
and the Employment Regulations Act 1999 (ERA 1999). 54
Employees were perceived as having no legitimate interests in the
business of the company or its assets, and directors owed no duties
towards the employees. Therefore, employees might only benefit
from the directors’ decisions when the interest of employees is
consistent with that of the shareholders. 55 In Hampton v Price’s
Patent Candle Co., it was held that keeping the workforce happy and
satisfied was a prudent capitalist policy, but it was not a legal
requirement.56 The refusal of the court to consider the interests of
employees was once again reflected by the operation of the ultra vires
rule in Hutton v. West Cork Rwy. Co. Ltd., in which the Court of
Appeal confirmed that it was beyond the capacity of a company to
make gratuitous payments to past or present employees. 57 In sum, in
the early years of the UK company law, directors were not required
to consider employees’ interests.
As a consequence of the increasing interactions between
businesses and employees in practice, 58 employees’ interests were
53

HANSMANN, supra note 30, at 589; Steven Anderman, Termination of
Employment: Whose Property Rights?, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 101, 126
(Catherine Barnard, Simon Deakin & Gillian Morris eds., 2004).
54
PROCTOR & MILES, supra note 4, at 54.
55
See Hutton v. West Cork Rwy. Co. Ltd. [1883] 23 Ch. D. 654 (AC) (holding that
directors may only spend money “for the purposes which are reasonably incidental
to the carrying on of the business of the company” and thus are not free to pay the
employees); see also David Milman, From Servant to Stakeholder: Protecting the
Employee Interests in Company Law, in CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW:
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS 149 (David Feldman & Frank Meisel eds., 1996).
56
Hampton v Price’s Patent Candle Co. [1876] 44 LJ Ch 437.
57
Hutton v. West Cork Rwy. Co. Ltd. [1883] 23 Ch. D. 654, 671.
58
See Charlotte Villiers, UK Report on the Employer and the Relationship between
Labour
Law
and
Company
Law
(2000),
http://www.dirittodellavoro.it/public/current/miscellanea/atti/pontignano2000/Vill
iers.html [https://perma.cc/V7N2-63LT] (discussing the similarity between
directors’ service agreements and employment law documents as well as the
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first recognised in UK company law in the government white paper
on company law in 1977. 59 In 1977, the Bullock Report 60 on
Industrial Democracy was set up by the Labour government of the
day, in order to advocate for a radical extension of industrial
democracy through requiring that unions be given the right in law to
protect employees’ interests. There were three proposals considered
by the Bullock Committee. First, the Committee considered the
establishment of a Trade Union Council, which would have given
trades unions the right to demand that employees elect half of the
directors in large companies.61 Second, there was also a proposal for
the establishment of an Eurasian Economic Commission, which
would require large companies to have a supervisory council in
addition to an executive board, in which one third of the members
would be elected by the company employees. 62 Third, it was
proposed by the Confederation of British Industry that companies
should be required to negotiate employee representation schemes
with their own employees, without any legislation to prescribe format
or proportions.63
The Bullock Committee concluded by recommending the
creation of a commission to observe, encourage and recommend
specific steps for employee representation.64 In detail, it was required
that employees “should have equal right with shareholder to
representation on board of private companies employing two
thousand or more” employees. 65 Unlike in some Continental
European countries, this representation take place through trade
union machinery, rather than by all the employees.66 However, the
response of the Confederation of British Industry was “almost
uniformly antagonistic.” 67 In response to the universal hostile
relationship between business decisions and employment relationships).
59
H.M.S.O., THE CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, 1977, Cmnd. 7037, at 2 (UK).
60
LORD BULLOCK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY, 1977, Cmnd. 6706, at 84.
61
Id. at 26–28.
62
Id. at 28–30.
63
Id. at 30–32.
64
Id. at 160–166.
65
Ben Clift, Andrew Gamble & Michael Harris, The Labour Party and the
Company, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 51, 77 (John Parkinson,
Andrew Camble & Gavin Kelly eds., 2000).
66
Id.
67
See Adrian Williamson The Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy and the
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attitude from business and lack of enthusiasm in the Cabinet, after
consultations, a White Paper on Industrial Democracy appeared in
May 1978 as a “much diluted form of the Bullock Report.” 68
Eventually, the Labor government lost power before any of these
proposals were actually adopted by Parliament. After the return of a
Conservative government in 1979, the issue of employee
involvement was removed from the political agenda.69
Apart from the unsuccessful attempt by the Bullock Report to
protect employees’ interests, directors’ duties to consider the interests
of their employees were also recognized in 1977, when a government
white paper, Conduct of Company Directors, acknowledges that
directors ought to consider their employees’ interests:
The Government believes that employees should be
given legal recognition by company law. The statutory
definition of the duty of directors will require directors
to take into account the interests of employees as well
as of shareholders. They will also be required to send
the annual report to all employees as well as to
shareholders.70
A Companies Bill in 1978 also proposes the statutory
codification of directors’ duties towards employees. 71 It is provided
in Clause 46 of the Bill that: “The matters to which the directors of
the company are to have regard in the performance of their functions
shall include the interests of the company’s employees generally, as
well as the interests of its members.”72 However, the Bill was never
enacted since it had lapsed by the 1979 General Election. 73

Post-War Consensus, Contemporary British History, 30 CONTEMP. BRIT. HIST. 119,
119 (2016).
68
CLIFT, GAMBLE & HARRIS, supra note 65, at 80.
69
See Adrian Williamson, The Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy and the
Post-War Consensus, Contemporary British History, 30 CONTEMP. BRI. HIST. 119,
135–137 (2016).
70
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, THE CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, 1977, Cmnd.
7037 (Eng.).
71
Companies Bill 1978, §46 (Eng.).
72
Companies Bill 1978, §46 (Eng.).
73
SALEEM SHEIKH, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 332–
333 (2003).
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Assessment of Article 309
The first company statute to acknowledge employees’
interests was the Companies Act 1985, 74 in which it is stated that “the
matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the
performance of their functions include the interests of the company’s
employees in general, as well as the interests of its members.” 75
Under company law legislation, Section 309 of the Companies Act
1985 imposes a statutory duty upon directors to consider the interests
of employees when carrying out their duties, and disclose information
in annual reports about employees and employment practices.
Section 309 specifically states that the duty it imposes on directors is
owed exclusively to the company and enforceable in the same way as
other fiduciary duties owed to a company. This means that the duty
to consider the interests of employees “can be enforced only by the
directors themselves or by shareholders through derivative action.” 76
Moreover, the duty is not a great burden for the directors since the
law simply requires the directors to consider the employees, rather
than acting in their best interests. According to the statute, it is
enough merely for directors “to have regard” to their employees’
interests, a provision by which it created a defense for directors who
have prioritized employees’ interests over those of members. 77 The
Section has not provided any legal mechanisms that could be used by
employees or employee representatives to enforce the duty; therefore,
it has been rarely invoked in the courts.78 Moore argued that Section
309 “served to detract from, rather than reaffirmed primacy of

74

See The Companies Act 1985, § 719 (Eng.); The Insolvency Act 1986, § 187
(Eng.) (discussing the interests of employees, granting the power to a company to
make gratuitous provision for employees on the cessation of a company’s business,
even though this provision “is not in the best interests of the company”).
75
The Companies Act 1985, §309 (Eng.).
76
See WANJIRU NJOYA, PROPERTY IN WORK: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FIRM 158 (2007).
77
Alistair Alcock, An Accidental Change to Directors' Duties? 30 COMP. L. 362,
365 (2009).
78
John Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy
and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531, 537
(2003).
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shareholders as a corporate beneficiary.” 79 Section 309 was
effectively a “statutory provision without teeth.”80
From a practical point of view, Parkinson also argued against
certain deficiencies of Section 309 when he pointed out that the
Section would not have much effect on the way companies operate in
practice. 81 This is because the duty imposed by Section 309 is a
subjective duty. Directors “must act in accordance with what they
believe to be an appropriate balancing of sometimes conflicting
interests,”82 while the court is unable to “intervene merely because it
disagrees with the way in which the directors have weighted those
interests.” 83 Further, there is no guidance in the Section for how
directors should interpret their responsibility under the provision.
There is also no guidance about directors’ direction, or about a
practical method for how directors should balance the interests of
shareholders and employees “or the relative weight which can be
given to the interests of employees.” 84 Managerial strategies will
mostly be based on the unrestricted discretion of the directors.
Furthermore, this specific duty appears to be unenforceable
because there is no direct means of enforcing it, either individually or
collectively. According to Section 309 (2), “the duty is owed to the
company (and the company alone) and is enforceable in the same way
as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors.” 85
Therefore, if the employees of the company and other parties hope to
challenge the directors’ decisions and conduct, they must bring the
actions derivatively through the company. If the people in control of
the company at the relevant time do not authorize the company to
bring an action against the directors, the employees will have no

79

MARC MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 192
(2013).
80
See John Farrar & BRENDA HANNIGAN, FARRAR’S COMPANY LAW 302 (1998).
81
JOHN EDWARD PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN
THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 83–84 (1995).
82
Id. at 84.
83
Id. at 84.
84
See Simon Goulding & Lilian Miles, Regulating the Approaches of Companies
towards Employees: The New Statutory Duties and Reporting Obligations of
Directors within the United Kingdom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 90 (Stephen Tully ed., 2005).
85
PARKINSON, supra note 81, at 83.
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remedy under Section 309, even when their interests have been
adversely affected by those actions.86
Moreover, proceedings for breach of fiduciary duties may,
under certain circumstances, be commenced in the derivative form by
a member of a company on the company’s behalf. “This raises the
possibility of an employee with a shareholding being allowed to
enforce the section 309 duty derivatively.” 87 However, recent rulings
effectively “bar any derivative action that does not have the approval
of a majority of shareholders other than those who are defendant.” 88
Therefore, the only way that Section 309 might be enforced would be
if employees are also shareholders who own a majority of shares in
the company, and they subsequently bring an action against the
directors. Therefore, “Fitting such a claim into the requirements for
a derivative action would, however, demand greater judicial
creativity than can perhaps in the circumstances be realistically
expected.” 89 It is also significant to stress that Section 309 is
permissive rather than mandatory, and that it clearly states that the
employees cannot sue for any breach of duty owed to them. These
characteristics—the non-mandatory nature and the lack of direct
standing to sue—are also typical of current constituency statutes in
the US.90
Despite all those deficiencies, Section 309 is still a positive
and significant provision, which “represents a tentative step towards
recognising the employees’ role in an enterprise. 91 Nevertheless, the
Company Law Review Steering Group stipulated that Section 309
should be repealed. 92 In their view, there was a danger that the
Section might be interpreted as enabling directors to prefer
employees’ interests over those of shareholders, which would
threaten the principle of shareholder supremacy. 93 Therefore,
86

Id.
Id.
88
Leonard S. Sealy, Director’s Wider Responsibilities—Problems Conceptual,
Practical and Procedural, 13 MONASH U. L. REV. 164, 184 (1987).
89
PARKINSON, supra note 81, at 83.
90
See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227 (2004).
91
See JOHN H. FARRAR & BRENDA HANNIGAN, FARRAR’S COMPANY LAW 386
(1998).
92
See Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a
Competitive Economy: Strategic Framework, §§5.1.20–5.1.23 (1999).
93
Id. at §§5.1.21.
87
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directors should consider employees’ interests only in the process of
promoting shareholders’ interests.94 This argument is not convincing,
since it fails to consider the importance of sustaining the relationship
between shareholders and other stakeholders, including employees,
in the process of pursuing the objective of long-term shareholder
value.
Information Disclosure and the Operating and Financial Review
The traditional functions of disclosure include reducing
information asymmetries and avoiding market failure. 95 Open, clear,
interactive and honest reporting will assist the company in building
sustainable relationships with stakeholders.
The European
Commission alleges that transparency in regards to information on
environmental and social matters leads to better corporate
performance over time, reduces financing costs, attracts and retains
talented employees, meaning that such a company is ultimately more
successful.96 As an essential element of the accountability approach
to company law, disclosure is designed to demonstrate corporate
commitment, and to increase the public’s understanding and
awareness of corporate social performance.97 Justice Brandeis stated
that the purpose of disclosure (publicity) is “a remedy for social and
industrial diseases” as “sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants[.]”98
The Company Law Review (“CLR”) proposed that
companies of economic significance should prepare an Operating and
Financial Review (“OFR”), which is intended to be qualitative in
character, containing all the information pertinent to assessing the
performance and future prospects of a company, including its
relationships with its employees and its impact on the community and
94

Id at §§5.1.23.
BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC
77–78 (2019).
96
European Commission, Disclosure of Non-financial and Diversity Information
by Large Companies and Groups—Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 15, 2014),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_14_301
[https://perma.cc/VU9W-FGTW].
97
Kellye Y Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social
Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1235 (2002).
98
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
65 (2009).
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environment.99 It was acknowledged by the CLR that stakeholders
such as employees “had a legitimate interest in the company’s
activities, particularly in the case of companies which exercise
significant economic power.” 100 OFR should provide necessary
information judged by the directors judge “for an understanding of
the business, such as relationships with employees, suppliers and
customers, environmental and community impact, corporate
governance and management of risk.”101
After an extensive public consultation process, the British
“parliament passed a statute, requiring 1,290 British-based
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, the New York
Stock Exchange or NASDAQ publish an OFR” on May 21, 2004.102
The new OFR requires companies to identify material, social and
environmental risks, and to disclose information about those risks. 103
The regulation has operated to give much greater prominence to
issues related to corporate social and environmental responsibilities.
The purpose of the OFR is to give directors a chance to
explain to shareholders and other stakeholder issues such as how they
have looked after their social responsibilities, their employees, the
environment, consumers and the community. The OFR is regarded
as a safeguard against the negative implications and effects of an
excessive focus on short-term shareholder returns. The ultimate aim
of this inclusive approach is to be achieved by companies establishing
successful relationships with members of the supply chain, the
community and the environment.104
It is also proposed by the White Paper that rather than
imposing duties on the directors, “wider interests” will be taken care
of by providing “a narrative report covering the main factors
underlying the company’s performance and which is intended to give
a broader view of the company’s operations than the purely financial
99

Robert Goddard, Modernising Company Law: The Government’s White Paper,
66 MOD. L. REV. 402, 405 (2003).
100
COMPANY LAW REVIEW, MODERN COMPANY LAW: FINAL REPORT, §§ 3.28–30
(2001).
101
MODERN COMPANY LAW: FINAL REPORT, supra note 100, at 19 (2001).
102
Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Triumph or Tragedy—The Curious Path
of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the U.K., 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 317, 317 (2007).
103
WILLIAMS & CONLEY, supra note 50, at 500 (2005).
104
Lee Roach, The Legal Model of the Company and the Company Law Review, 26
COMPANY LAW. 98, 102 (2005).
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reports” 105 —–namely the OFR. 106 The report is intended to be
qualitative (e.g. including the balance sheet) and historical (e.g.
reporting past years’ financial results). It is also intended to cover
internal company matters (e.g. the size of the workforce) and contain
all the information that is material to an assessment of the company’s
performance and future prospects, including its relationship with its
employees, customers and suppliers and its impact on the community
and environment. 107 The government also made suggestions on
proposed legislation for the OFR, to shed light on its important role
in company reporting.108
The legal requirement for quoted companies 109 to provide an
OFR was once again stipulated in the Company Law Bill 2005, in
which directors were required to prepare an OFR for each fiscal
year.110 Directors who fail to comply with the requirements will be
committing an offence, and will be liable to a fine not exceeding a
statutory maximum. 111 The Secretary of State may also make
provision by regulation as to the objective and contents of the OFR. 112
However, the legislation and enforcement of the OFR as a
reporting policy for directors are still open to debate, and further
modifications are necessary to perfect them. In practice, if ESV
means balancing the interests of shareholders and stakeholders for the
benefit of the long-term interests of a company, the disclosure of
relevant issues in the OFR cannot by itself generate meaningful
change in corporate practice as the disclosure measures is only seen

105

The White Paper on Modernising Company Law, HOUSE OF COMMONS TRADE
A White Paper is an authoritative report and
is seen as a statement of government policy.
106
Id. at 18.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 18.
109
According to Section The Companies Act 2006, §385(2), (Eng.), a quoted
company is a company whose equity share capital:
(a)has been included in the official list in accordance with the provisions
of Part 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c. 8), or
(b)is officially listed in an EEA State, or
(c)is admitted to dealing on either the New York Stock Exchange or the
exchange known as Nasdaq.
110
Company Law Reform Bill 2005–6, HL Bill [34] cl. 393 (Gr. Brit.).
111
Id. at cl. 395.
112
Id. at cl. 394.
AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE 18 (2002).
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as one of the dimensions or legislative approaches of the regulatory
framework to promote interests of stakeholders. 113
Progressive Changes Brought by the Companies Act 2006
Before the Companies Act 2006, the maximization of
shareholder wealth was not only a theory, but also a basic feature of
the corporate ideology and public belief in the UK. 114 As a
consequence, this legal framework was criticized on the grounds of
“limiting any accountability to stakeholders within a framework of,
and to the overall purpose of, profit-maximization for
shareholders.”115 The UK ESV principle, a newly-defined corporate
objective of the company, has been set out in the Companies Act 2006,
stipulated in Section 172 (1). The ESV principle 116 emphasizes the
significance of coordinating stakeholder relationships for
corporations’ long-term development, and it also aims to make
directors aware of the gradual transformation occurring in legal and
social frameworks in which corporations exist and operate, and to
allow them to subsequently adjust their managerial routines. For
those directors who are enthusiastic in balancing shareholder and
stakeholder concerns, Section 172 offers them legitimacy in doing so
and some surety against being sued, provided that their actions
benefit shareholders too.117 The ESV in new UK company law is a
significant attempt to introduce stakeholder considerations into the
previous shareholder-centered corporate governance scheme; it is
hoped that the growing consideration of stakeholders’ interests in
codified directors’ duties will be an efficient means of establishing a

113

See Jingchen Zhao, Promoting More Socially Responsible Corporations
through A Corporate Law Regulatory Framework, 37 LEG. STUD. 103, 115–133
(2017).
114
ARMOUR ET AL, supra note 78, at 535 (2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy, the Means and Ends of Corporate Governance 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547,
576 (2003).
115
Janice Dean, Stakeholding and Company Law, 22 COMP. L. 66, 70 (2001).
116
See generally ANDREW KEAY, THE ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE
PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2013) (offering a comprehensive and in
detail discussion on ESVP).
117
Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the
United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’, 29 SYDNEY L. REV.
577, 599 (2007).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

407

long-term corporate culture, and the necessity of corporate disclosure
will further enhance directors’ regard for stakeholder interests.
There were no separate sections regarding directors’ duties
towards employees in the Companies Act 2006. The legislative
position with regard to the extent as to which directors of companies
are required to consider the interests of their employees when making
management decisions has now been reformulated by Section 172 in
the context of directors’ duties to promote the success of the
company.118 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 emphasized the
likely consequences of directors’ duties in the long term. 119
Recognition of the long-term interests of companies is one of the
major advantages of adopting the stakeholder model in company law.
The interests of employees, as the primary stakeholders who play a
significant role in innovation and reform within corporations, are
certainly crucial in shaping an efficient corporate structure for the
benefit of the long-term interests of the company.
Compared to Section 309 in the 1985 Act, Section 172 (1) (b)
of the 2006 Act gives legitimacy to directors who consider the
interests of employees.120 This means that where (or to the extent that)
the purposes of the company consist of or include the purpose of the
benefit of its employees, it can be asserted that directors’ decisions
are made with the goal of promoting the success of the company for
the benefit of its members. Since the success of the company was
defined clearly in Section 172 (1) (a) as long-term success, 121
corporate decisions in favor of employees’ interests will be justified
as long as they are directed at the long-term interests of the
corporation. These decisions are common among companies in the
new knowledge-based economic age, where specific employees are
hired because of their unique professional knowledge that is crucial
to product improvements and professional techniques. Indeed, the
same holds true for companies that employ irreplaceable employees.
Functioning alongside directors’ duties, corporate disclosure
has long been regarded as an important way of enhancing corporate
accountability and improving the transparency of corporate activities.
In light of the growing awareness of long-term development and
118

The Companies Act 2006, §172 (1) (b) (Gr. Brit.).
Id. at §172 (1) (a).
120
Id. at §172 (1) (b).
121
Id. at §172 (1) (a).
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stakeholder considerations, there has been an increasing demand for
corporations to produce reports detailing their commitments to social
and environmental issues. A significant modification in the
Companies Act 2006 is the introduction of the Business Review as
the replacement of OFR in line with the minimum requirements of
the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive 2003. This is announced
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on November 2005 in a speech
to the Confederation of British Industry.122 The Directive called for
a company’s annual report to include “both financial and, where
appropriate, non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the
particular business, including information relating to environmental
and employee matters (when necessary).” 123
After the enforcement of Section 417 of the Companies Act
2006, “the Directors’ Report and Business Review became the central
narrative reporting document in the corporate disclosure regime.” 124
The general idea is that the Business Review’s requirements for
directors will be less onerous on companies but still valuable for
shareholders and other stakeholders. Section 417 of the Companies
Act 2006 makes an amendment on information disclosure
requirement by requiring directors to include in the Business Review
“a fair review of the company’s business and a description of the
principal risks and uncertainties facing the company.” 125 The
Business Review must “to the extent necessary for an understanding
of the development, performance or position of the company’s
business.126 “The amendment places an obligation on the directors of
public companies to include in their annual business review anything
that might be a liability to the company’s profits” by incurring
reputational damages, such as contracts with stakeholders that could
122

The OFR requirement was amended on March 21, 2005 in Schedule 7ZA of the
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and Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005, 2005 No. 1011 (Gr. Brit.); see also
Company Law Reform Bill 2005–6, HL Bill [34] cl. 393–95 (Gr. Brit.).
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Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June
2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and
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banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings, art. 2, 2003 O.J.
(L 178) 10 (EC).
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Olaojo Aiyegbayo & Charlotte Villiers, The Enhanced Business Review: Has It
Made Corporate Governance More Effective?, J. BUS. L. 699, 699 (2011).
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The Companies Act 2006, §417 (3) (Gr. Brit.).
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potentially expose the company to take excessive risk of causing
social or environmental harm. 127 The purpose of the Business
Review is “to inform members of the company and help them assess
how the directors have performed their duty under Section 172.”128
The obligations imposed on quoted companies are more onerous in
comparison. Their Business Reviews must “to the extent necessary
for an understanding of the development, performance or position of
the company’s business, include—(a) the main trends and factors
likely to affect the future development, performance and position of
the company’s business; and (b) information about—(i)
environmental matters . . . , (ii) the company’s employees, and (iii)
social and community issues[.]”129
However, it is also argued that in order to ensure that the
Business Review achieves the aim associated with directors’ duties
to promote the success of the company, it is important to offer more
guidance to directors to avoid a box-ticking approach and protect
directors from the increased administrative burden. 130 Furthermore,
it is debatable whether the Review will constitute a genuine account
of the stewardship of all relationships in which the company is
involved. On the positive side, as the second limb of the ESV
principle embedded in Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006,
the requirement for a Business Review can do a good enough job if
companies embrace the idea underpinning the need for the
requirement.
It provides legislative support for minimum
information disclosure in Company Law statutes on environmental
and social issues. The requirement is regarded as one of the main
approaches to the legal enforcement of CSR-related corporate
strategy.131
The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’
Report) Regulations 2013 amended the Companies Act 2006
127

Demetra Arsalidou, The Withdrawal of the Operating and Financial Review in
the Company Bill 2006: Progression or Regression?, 28 COMPANY LAW. 131, 134
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128
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 417 (2) (Gr. Brit.).
129
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130
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131
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regarding issues of information disclosure. 132 Section 417 of the
Companies Act 2006 was repealed in this amendment. 133 Instead of
a “business review,” companies must now produce a “strategic report”
pursuant to the new Sections 414A-D in Companies Act 2006. 134
Similar to the OFR and the Business Review, companies submitting
strategic reports will need to consider reporting social and
environmental elements to inform members of the company so that
the members can assess how the directors have performed their duty
to promote the success of the company through information about any
policies of the company in relation to social and environmental
matters and their effectiveness.135
The nature and scope of the strategic report principally
replicate the business review. However, there are also a few changes
for quoted companies. First, apart from environmental matters,
company employees and social and community issues, 136 quoted
companies also have to include, “to the extent necessary for an
understanding of the development, performance or position of their
business,” information about human rights issues, including
information on any human rights policy and its effectiveness. 137
Second, quoted companies also have to include, with the purpose of
enhancing the requirements on employees:
[A] breakdown showing, at the end of the financial
year—(i) the number of persons of each sex who were
directors of the quoted company; (ii) the number of
persons of each sex who were senior managers of the
quoted company and the undertakings consolidated in
the quoted company’s accounts; and (iii) the number
of persons of each sex who were employees of the
quoted company and its consolidated undertakings.138
132

See The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report)
Regulations 2013, §414A–D (Gr. Brit.).
133
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134
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135
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Third, taking the environmental issues one step further,
“disclosure concerning greenhouse gas emissions” is introduced in
Part 7 of the amendment, where a quoted company is required to
“state the annual quantity of emissions in tonnes of carbon
dioxide.” 139 Another two terminologies are also introduced to
ascertain the scope of strategic reports for quoted companies, namely
“company’s strategy” and “business model.” 140 These are terms that
are repeatedly used in corporate governance codes when discussing
annual reports,141 long-term corporate value142 and advice from audit
committees.143 Therefore, this new requirement can be regarded as a
bridge between the Companies Act and the UK Corporate
Governance Code, making existing “comply or explain” disclosures
mandatory. In the author’s opinion, the new strategic report has not
substantially changed the requirements embedded in the business
review. However, it is encouraging to see that the amendment
provides more detailed requirements regarding employees’ and
environmental issues, as well as a recognition of human rights issues
and links between corporate governance codes and information
disclosure for quoted companies.

PROTECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER
CHINESE COMPANY LAW
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in
1949, the initial development stage of companies and companyrelated policies were related to the strongly centralized planned
economy in the years between 1949 and 1978. During that time, the
Danwei (work unit) was a popular notion, referring to a place of
employment that was commonly used in the context of state-owned
enterprises (“SOEs”). Danwei was a unique organizational structure
which divided individuals into different groups based on their
employers. The term “played an all-encompassing role for urban
citizens” as danwei of an employee will dictate her “work life,
political life, economic well-being and, ultimately, membership in
139
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society.”144 At that stage, corporations bore responsibilities beyond
the scope of corporate responsibility as they should have been borne
by the government.
Employees’ interests in China have also been recognized in
Chinese company law. The idea of protecting domestic and
international employees, introduced into China in the 1990s mainly
through global supply chains, was driven by both internal social
problems and by economic interests in the global market. 145 The
Chinese government reconsidered its policy and economic
development goals for the long-term sustainable development of
China in order to respond to these pressures. Currently, in the
Chinese Company Law (hereinafter CCL) 2006 and the Chinese
Corporate Governance Code 2018, we can observe the following
legislative initiatives to promote employees’ interests directly or
indirectly.
Article 5 on CSR
Low level of transparency for the legislative process in China
“leaves it unclear why the legislators finally decided to incorporate
CSR into the company law.”146 Article 5 of CCL 2018 states that “a
company shall comply with the laws and administrative regulations,
social morality, and business morality. It shall act in good faith,
accept the supervision of the government and general public, and bear
social responsibilities.”147 It is implied in Article 5 that commercial
144
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People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006; revised by the Standing
Comm, Nat’l People’s Cong., October 26, 2018, effective Oct. 26 2018) ST.
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art.
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http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=e797dd968c30e172bdfb&lib=law
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see also Li Xiuxin Yu Qingdao Jiesheng Youxiang Gongsi, Xue Xiaoming Gongsi
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activities of a company have a wider impact on social interests,
including those of its employees. Moreover, ethical terms such as
“business ethics” and “social responsibilities” were introduced in the
general provisions of CCL to encourage corporate responsibility
beyond economic and legal responsibility explicitly.148 The Article
gives directors legitimacy to consider employees’ interests. Despite
the fact that Article 5 has been widely criticized for its lack of
enforceability and effectiveness, the Article has had an educational
impact on corporations, and affirms the government’s attention to and
policy support for the recognition of the interests of stakeholders
through the explicit consideration of CSR in company law.
Employee Participation and Company Trade Unions
Employee participation is a broad term, including possible codetermination measures like employee representation on the
corporate board, employee representation through labour union,
collective bargaining arrangements, or sharing ownership with
employees. Employees may not always be able protect themselves
contractually against loss of their human capital investment in the
company due to the limits of ex ante contractual solutions.149 They
are somehow as vulnerable as shareholders. 150 Consequently,
employees’ interests and shareholders’ interests should be considered
simultaneously by the board of directors. Employee participation
may also change employees’ attitudes to work, increase their
alignment with corporate and management values and consequently
enhance employee motivation and company performance. 151
Employee directorship is already a common practice globally, but the
adoption of this notion can also be observed in jurisdictions that are
Ltd., Xue Xiaoming Company Dissolution Dispute Case], Stanford L. Sch. China
Guiding Project (Higher People's Ct. of Shandong Province Oct. 23, 2015) (holding
that it is necessary to consider not only the interests of shareholders but also the
impact of corporate dissolution on the public interest when judging whether a
company should be dissolved).
148
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149
Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, Protecting the Employment Bargain, U.
TORONTO L. J. 751, 754–766 (1993).
150
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151
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traditionally shareholder value oriented, such as the US and the UK.
In terms of the UK government’s willingness to accept a proposal for
stakeholder participation, at the launch of her campaign to become
the Leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, Theresa May claimed that “the people who run big
businesses are supposed to be accountable to outsiders, to nonexecutive directors, who are supposed to ask the difficult
questions.”152 She promised to “have not just consumers represented
on company boards, but employees as well.” 153 May used the term
“accountable”
positively
when
addressing
corporations’
responsibilities to outsiders, and she is an advocate of the notion of
stakeholder participation to benefit the long-term interests of the
corporations.
In China, CCL 2018 set out a series of new stipulations
concerning employee participation. As far as limited liability
companies are concerned, based on Article 44 “if a limited liability
company established by two or more state-owned enterprises or other
state-owned investors, the board of directors shall include
representatives of the employees of the companies. The board of
directors of any other limited liability company may also include
representatives of the employees of the company concerned.” 154
Compared to the old company law, the new company law enlarges
the scope of employees as internal directors in all forms of companies.
As for joint stock limited companies, according to Article 109 of CCL
2018 “the board of directors may include representatives of the
company's employees. The representatives of the employees who
serve as board directors shall be democratically elected through the
assembly of the representatives of the employees, the assembly of
employees, or other methods. . .”155 This piece of legislation ensures
that the voice of employees will be heard and employees’ interests
will be considered at board meetings when decisions are made.
Moreover, trade unions play an important role in promoting
the interests of employees in the Chinese corporate governance model.
Trade unions generally are regarded as legitimate and effective
152
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deliberative partners with the firm in the trajectory of development
towards more ethical companies with positive contributions towards
deliberative democracy.156 According to Article 18 of CCL 2018, a
company’s employees shall organise a labour union to carry out trade
union activities and safeguard the lawful rights and interests of the
employees.157 “The company shall provide necessary conditions for
its labour union to carry out activities. The labour union shall, on
behalf of the employees, sign collective contracts with the company
with respect to the remuneration, working hours, welfare, insurance,
work safety and sanitation, and other matters.”158 To make a decision
about restructuring or any major issues concerning its business
operation or the formulation of important rules and regulations, a
company shall solicit opinions from its trade union, and its staff and
workers through the staff and workers’ congress or other forums. 159
Ethical Elements in Corporate Governance Code
As a general principle under the Code of Corporate
Governance for Listed Companies, a listed company is required to
“respect the legitimate rights of . . . employees[.]” 160 More actively,
the code also facilitates opportunities and environments for
protecting the interests of stakeholders, including employees, by
requiring companies to “provide the necessary conditions to ensure
the legitimate rights of stakeholders” with “channels for redress for
infringement of rights.” 161 A company shall encourage employee
feedback regarding the company’s operating and financial situations
and important decisions affecting employee benefits through direct
communication with the board of directors, the supervisory board and
management personnel. Furthermore, communication with
employees is also encouraged by listening to and reflecting their
156
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voices and interests, both individually and collectively, to establish
interactive, collaborative, and mutually engaged relationships with
employees, with these engagements focusing on goals beyond
corporate self-interest. According to the Code of Corporate
Governance for Listed Companies, “[a] company shall encourage
employees’ feedback regarding . . . important decisions affecting
employee’s benefits through direct communications with the board
of directors, the supervisory board and the management
personnel.”162
The Corporate Governance Code in China is “soft law”
established by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 163
These soft law approaches have “potential benefits in dealing with
costs, contingencies and complementarities” 164 and these benefits are
key for addressing social and environmental challenges as they are
always resistant to conventional approaches and uncertain. Soft law
does allow a role for individual autonomy and circumstances in
shaping an appropriate compliance response, and its inherent
flexibility facilitates companies in buying into the “spirit” of the code
as well as the letter. 165 However, the approach has also received
criticism for the lack of an independent judiciary with enforcement
powers and the inability to mandate uniform minimum standards.166
The approach is seen as a window-dressing exercise, “less definitive
and does not create enforceable rights and duties.” 167 In other word,
“soft law is voluntary” and “lacks mutually agreed upon
162
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obligations.”168 Furthermore, Chandler sees voluntary approaches to
address these sustainability challenges as a curse, distracting attention
from the necessity for effective external control, as “governments
failed to respond adequately to the implications of a globally
economy and to demand accountability from company.” 169 An
approach with voluntary characteristics may not be able to keep pace
with the intensity and broad range of sustainability challenges, as well
as the strong push not only from social expectations but also from
external forces such as global best practices standards and the need
for global public goods. These best practice standards come from
various sources. With a focus on employees’ interests and human
rights-related issues, SA8000:2014170 is a set of auditable corporate
social accountability standards established in 1997 by the Council of
Economic Priorities Accreditation Association. It is currently
supervised by Social Accountability International. SA8000:2014 is
designed to “provide an auditable, voluntary standard, based on the
UN Declaration of Human Rights, ILO and other international human
rights and labour norms and national labour laws.”171 The system
requires ongoing compliance and continual improvement of ethical
standards of corporations, with involvement from stakeholders
including participation by all key sectors in the SA8000 system, such
as employees, trade unions, companies, socially responsible investors,
nongovernmental organizations, the government and the public. 172
The system also introduces nine social accountability requirements
such as child labour and forced or compulsory labour.173 Therefore,
a hybrid regulatory framework involving both soft law and hard law
will “promote the alignment of internal business goals with externally
set societal goals.” 174 Combination of mandatory and voluntary
168
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mechanisms will provide the most appropriate solution, where each
complements the other.175

CONCLUSION
The new economy has finally arrived in the twenty-first
century after being heralded for a long time. The new economy
focuses on talent, knowledge and information, and is based on mobile
devices such as email, the Internet and intranets. It is characterized
by a greater stability of GDP and prices, together with a potential drop
in unemployment and inflation. In the new economic era, companies
benefit from the impact of technological innovation on creating longterm wealth. Compared to the old economy, information technology
plays a massive role, and successful companies are always those who
are the first to obtain sensitive information.
In the new economy, successful companies always engage
with various stakeholders not only inside the company, but also
outside—for goods and services, finance, labor and political
patronage. Good relationships with employees, consumers, local
communities and the media are significant in promoting the
competence and reputation of a company. The performance of its
employees in terms of technological innovation has and will continue
to accelerate the development of the company, especially in the field
of advanced technologies. It is evident that human capital plays a
crucial role and contributes significantly to the productivity growth
in the new economy. Therefore, rather than being regarded as an
expense of companies, employees should be regarded as an
investment.
In terms of the classic corporate objective debate, employees
are classified as primary and internal stakeholders. Jurisdictions
following a stakeholder approach requires the interests of employees
to be considered and protected by corporate directors. Hence, it is
argued that the stakeholder approach, if effectively implemented, is
an efficient way of protecting the interests of employees in the new
economic era.
The interests of employees are always in conflict with those
of shareholders and other stakeholders, and how to protect their
175
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interests under company law is an important question. After
discussing directors’ duties towards their employees, we find, under
the ESV model in the UK as well as under Chinese company law and
corporate governance codes, that the legal mechanisms are difficult
to enforce, regardless of their educational and guiding functions that
can help directors think more about operating in the long term and
change their behaviors when making decisions in relation to
employees’ interests.
Although directors have been offered
legitimacy to consider employees’ interests, employees do not
possess practical abilities to claim remedies if the directors’ decisions
injure their interests. Even though there are exceptions, the chances
of success in a challenge of this kind are extremely slim.
Further research on the enforcement of directors’ duties
towards employees under company law—–in jurisdictions other than
the UK and China will be beneficial, both academically and
practically. From an analysis of the CSR ratings for 23,000
companies from 114 countries, Liang and Renneboog claimed that
the CSR ratings and a country’s legal origin are closely and strongly
correlated.176 Comparing the business case of CSR and other factors
such as ownership, political institutions, and globalisation, legal
origin is argued as a strong explanation for CSR rating, with
Scandinavian civil law firms ranking the highest.177 Since this CSR
rating has a strong relationship with legal protection offered to
employees, we think it is worthwhile to investigate the legislative
experiences in jurisdictions such as Finland, Denmark, Gemmary or
Japan, which may open up new possibilities for transportation.
Moreover, as the performance of the new economy is aligned with
the pillars of sustainability including economic, environment, and
social pillars,178 it is also crucial to study the relationship between the
advantages of the stakeholder approach and the new economy in the
narrow and broad perspective. The study will broaden the horizon of
stakeholder protection in the new economy era beyond interests of
employees. The research findings will support policy makers to
design legislative approaches to address the sustainability challenges
as a result of irresponsible corporate conducts and mitigate risks of
176
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stakeholder misalignment by developing effective approaches to
tackle challenges with respect new economy.
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